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Transnational Criminal Law or the 
Transnational Legal Ordering of 
Corruption?
Theorizing Australian Corporate Foreign 
Bribery Reforms 
Dr. Radha Ivory* 
 To date, “transnational criminal law” has been the dominant 
paradigm for explaining and mapping rules on corruption in the 
international legal literature. Transnational criminal law is presented as a 
system of law descending from multilateral crime control treaties or a field or 
order that emerges through international political processes of regime 
formation. Transnational criminal lawyers identify and describe cross-border 
legal rules, and seek to evaluate them against liberal norms of democratic 
governance and individual civil and political human rights. This Article 
details the limits of transnational criminal conceptions of “anticorruption” 
through a study of proposed changes to Australian laws on corporate foreign 
bribery. Drawing on primary and secondary documentary sources, domestic 
and international, it shows that the emerging antipodean rules are only 
partially transnational, as that term is understood in transnational criminal 
law theory. Likewise, multilateral “suppression conventions” and related 
soft laws are but one impetus for the proposed changes to Australian federal 
anticorruption legislation. Rather, as the transnational legal ordering 
literature suggests, a recursive process appears to be at work between 
international organizations and local legislators, as well as transnational 
non-state actors, both charities and businesses. This process is marked by 

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[2019]  AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE FOREIGN BRIBERY REFORMS 27 
moments of borrowing from (former) patrons, the US and the UK. 
However, it is also punctuated by themes of modernization, economic 
efficiency, and reputation. In addition, Australian anti-corruption activities 
may result not just in changes to national criminal law, but also in the 
development of “new” – and controversial – techniques of governance.
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 27
I. Two Theories of Transnational Law in Criminal Justice ........................................ 29
II. Comparing the Theories in a Case of Foreign Bribery Reform ........................... 31
A. Approach to the Comparison ....................................................................... 31
B. Selecting Australia ........................................................................................... 32
C. Background to the CCC Bill ......................................................................... 33
D. Method of Analysis ........................................................................................ 34
III. TCL and TLO Theory in the Australian Case ...................................................... 36
A. “Transnational Law” and the Proposed Australian Reforms .................. 37
1. International Standards and Statements .............................................. 37
2. Anglo-American Precedents ................................................................. 39
3. Australian and Multinational Drivers .................................................. 41
4. Theorizing Transnational Law Reforms ............................................. 42
B. “Criminal Law” and the Proposed Australian Reforms ........................... 44
1. An Example of “New Governance”? .................................................. 45
2. The Prospects and Pitfalls of New Governance ............................... 46
3. Theorizing Non-Criminal Law Reforms ............................................. 49
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 50
INTRODUCTION
The bribery of foreign public officials is an inherently transnational 
offense. But are the rules against foreign bribery best viewed as “transnational 
criminal law?” For international lawyers, concepts of transnational criminal law are 
an obvious place to start categorizing supra-state anticorruption controls.1 As most 
elaborately theorized by legal academic Neil Boister, “TCL” is “the indirect 
suppression by international law through domestic penal law of criminal activities 
that have actual or potential trans-boundary effects” or “trans-boundary moral 
impacts.”2 TCL is a legal system, field, order, or space comprising state-to-state and 
state-to-person obligations with transnational crime as their focus.3 The bribery of 
foreign public officials can be seen as an example of TCL, so conceived, due to the 

1.  Radha Ivory, Beyond Transnational Criminal Law: Anti-Corruption as Global New Governance, 6 
LONDON REV. INT’L L. 413, n. 6 (2018) [hereinafter Ivory 2018] (with further references). 
2.  Neil Boister, “Transnational Criminal Law”? 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 953, 955 (2003) [hereinafter 
Boister 2003]; Neil Boister, The Concept and Nature of Transnational Criminal Law, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 11, 13 (Neil Boister & Robert Currie eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter Boister 2014]; Neil Boister, Further Reflections on the Concept of Transnational Criminal Law, 6 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 9, 13 (2015) [hereinafter Boister 2015]; NEIL BOISTER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 17 (2nd ed. 2018) [hereinafter BOISTER 2018]. 
3.  See, further, infra Part I. 
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multiple nationalities of its protagonists and its underlying matrix of international 
and domestic legal standards.4 In addition, the international norm against foreign 
bribery is a relatively recent prohibition that would appear to have resulted from the 
type of international moral politics that Boister would stress.5
However, as I argue elsewhere,6 there are important discrepancies between 
Boister’s conception of transnational criminal law and international anticorruption 
standards and practices.7 Supra-state rules against corruption are not only cross-
border or penal in the ways elaborated by transnational criminal lawyers; 
international standards and domestic obligations are but one modality for global 
corruption control. More overtly sociological approaches to transnational law are a 
better fit for the development and patterning of these anticorruption laws. More 
regulatory or preventive concepts of crime control may better capture the nature of, 
and problems with, their measures. Thus, I proposed Terrence Halliday and 
Gregory Shaffer’s transnational legal ordering (hereinafter TLO) theory as a more 
effective tool for explaining and critiquing anticorruption law as it emerges between 
international institutions, jurisdictions, and non-state organizations.8
Extending that analysis, this Article tests the utility of Boister’s conception, 
and of Halliday and Shaffer’s alternative approach, by examining an ongoing case 
of corporate foreign bribery reform from Australia. A federation of former British 
colonies in the Asia-Pacific, Australia belongs to several international economic 
crime initiatives, not least the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(hereinafter UN Convention) and the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter OECD Convention).9 To 
date, Australia’s federal (Commonwealth) government has implemented these 
anticorruption treaties inter alia with an offense against the bribery of foreign public 
officials and statutory corporate criminal liability principles.10 These provisions have 
been pronounced internationally compliant with duties to hold legal persons liable 
for foreign bribery.11 But they have also been questioned for their relative lack of 

4.  See, further, infra Part II(A).
5.  Id.
6.  Ivory 2018, supra note 1. 
7.  See also Sabine Gless, Bird’s-Eye View and Worm’s Eye View: Towards a Defendant-Based Approach 
in Transnational Criminal Law, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. THEORY 117 (2015); Prabha Kotiswaran & Nicola 
Palmer, Rethinking the “International Law of Crime”: Provocations from Transnational Legal Studies, 6 
TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 55 (2015). 
8.  See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 1 (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013) [hereinafter Shaffer 2013a]; 
Gregory Shaffer, Dimensions and Determinants of State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING
AND STATE CHANGE 23 (Gregory Shaffer ed. 2013) [hereinafter Shaffer 2013b]; Terrence C. Halliday 
& Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3 (Terrence C. 
Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015) [hereinafter Halliday & Shaffer 2015a]; Terrence Halliday & 
Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 475
(Terrence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015) [hereinafter Halliday & Shaffer 2015b]. 
9.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 ILM 1; 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 UNTS 41. 
10.  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Sch., §§ 12.1–12.6, 70.2 (Austl.) [hereinafter Code].
11.  See, generally, OECD Convention, supra note 9, at Arts. 1–3; UN Convention, supra note 9, 
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accompanying prosecutions. In December 2017, just days before International 
Anti-Corruption Day, the Commonwealth proposed a Crimes Legislation Amendment 
(Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 (hereinafter CCC Bill).12 That Bill would repeal 
and replace the generic foreign bribery offense and create a new corporate crime of 
failing to prevent foreign bribery, along with a system for negotiating corporate 
settlements in listed federal criminal matters.
In this Article, I analyze domestic and international documents 
surrounding the proposed Australian corporate bribery offense so as to compare 
the TCL and TLO approaches for their explanatory power. I argue that there is a 
repetition of the global problems with TCL theory in the Australian case and a clear 
example of the potential for a TLO analysis. First, the Australian case materials 
indicate a more heterogeneous set of inspirations for the corporate failing to prevent 
offense than Boister’s account suggests. A mixture of drivers—international, 
multinational, and domestic—are evident behind the proposed offense of corporate 
omission. This mixture of factors better fits Halliday and Shaffer’s 
conceptualization, which emphasizes the recursivity of transnational law-making 
processes. Second, the proposed Australian failing to prevent offense can be seen, 
not only as an instance of criminal law, but also as an example of law reform that 
deploys a “new” and controversial technique for governance. Transnational legal 
ordering theory is better able than TCL theory to illuminate these “non-criminal” 
features for evaluation and categorization. In sum, although the CCC Bill was still 
before Parliament as of early January 2019, this Australian case already shows the 
importance of viewing transnational law reform as a social process in the setting of 
particular jurisdictions, issue areas, and points in time.
The argument takes four steps towards its core conclusions. Part I 
summarizes the rival accounts of transnational law in the work of Boister and of 
Halliday and Shaffer respectively. Part II then provides background to the case 
study from Australia and my approach to the materials on the Australian case. Part 
III sets out my two findings from the analysis, examining the “transnational legality” 
and “transnational criminality” of Australia’s potential corporate foreign bribery 
offense, in turn. I then conclude but, to be clear, not with an estimation of the exact 
reasons for the proposed offense or a judgement as to whether it would be “good” 
or “bad” for anticorruption work or Australia. Instead, I summarize some key 
influences on, and characterizations of, the corporate offense so as to identify the 
strengths and limitations of the TCL and TLO conceptions of transnational criminal 
justice.
I. TWO THEORIES OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
So, what is “transnational criminal law” and what is the “transnational legal 
ordering” alternative? In Boister’s oft-cited account,13 transnational criminal law is 
a composite theory of international and domestic criminal law, which draws on 

at Arts. 16, 26 & 30. 
12.  Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter 
CCC Bill]. 
13.  Ivory 2018, supra note 1, at n. 9 (with further references and a review of allied concepts and 
labels in the literature). 
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positivist and constitutionalist traditions of jurisprudence, as well as on empirical 
accounts of norm emergence, especially from international relations. According to 
Boister, some laws are transnational because of their multiple sources and their 
cross-border crime focus. Hence, TCL consists of multilateral suppression 
conventions (or other supra-state arrangements) that commit countries to 
standardizing their domestic laws on particular crime problems and to cooperating 
with each other in ways that enable the enforcement of those laws.14 These 
“horizontal” rules are implemented through “vertical” obligations imposed by states 
on people.15 Such a collection of norms forms a legal system linked by analytical 
relationships and/or a legal order or field constituted by its subject matter (i.e., 
transnational crime).16
That transnational criminal subject matter is both normatively and 
analytically significant. Boister does not dispute that some crimes or harms cross 
borders or that legal change is recursive. As he writes, “the traffic” between 
international and domestic legal systems may go both ways.17 However, citing 
Nadelmann’s theory of “prohibition regimes” in international relations, he argues 
that transnational criminal law tends to reflect the preferences of powerful Western 
countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom.18 The resulting 
legal instruments are therefore likely to suffer from legitimacy deficits, as well as to 
authorize disproportionate interferences with individual civil rights.19 Boister calls 
for “general” or “ordering” principles that would correct TCL’s negative effects on 
state sovereignty and the administration of individual justice.20
By contrast, “transnational legal ordering” theory is a sociolegal 
methodology that can be used to examine the interacting “international and 
domestic determinants of criminal justice policymaking” in particular places and 
spaces.21 Like Boister, Halliday and Shaffer foreground the social construction of 
transnational issues and recognize the influence of international politics in these 
processes.22 However, TLO scholars are less concerned with whether a rule pertains 
to a (perceived) cross-border situation or whether that (perceived) phenomenon is 
ultimately regulated by an international instrument or regime. Rather, taking off 

14.  Boister 2003, supra note 2, at 962; BOISTER 2018, supra note 2, at 21–23. See also Boister 
2014, supra note 2, at 19; Boister 2015, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
15.  Boister 2003, supra note 2, at 972; Boister 2014, supra note 2, at 14 & 18; Boister 2015, supra
note 2, at 14 & 19; BOISTER 2018, supra note 2, at 18. 
16.  Boister 2003, supra note 2, at 956–57; Boister 2014, supra note 2, at 12–13, 21–22; Boister 
2015, supra note 2, at 25–26; BOISTER 2018, supra note 2, at Ch. 1 & 2, esp. 33. 
17.  BOISTER 2018, supra note 2, at 20. See also Boister 2014, supra note 2, at 14; Boister 2015, 
supra note 2, at 14. 
18.  See, esp. Boister 2015, supra note 2, at 25–26; BOISTER 2018, supra note 2, at 16 & 20–21 
(citing Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society 44 
INT’L ORG. 479 (1990) [hereinafter Nadelmann 1990]). See also PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN
NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 19–22 (2006) [hereinafter, ANDREAS & NADELMANN 2006]. 
19.  See, esp., Neil Boister, Human Rights Protections in the Suppression Conventions, 2 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 199, 200–03 (2002) [hereinafter Boister 2002]. 
20.  See, esp., Boister 2015, supra note 2, at 28–30; BOISTER 2018, supra note 2, at 422–27. 
21.  Ely Aarsonson & Gregory Shaffer, The Transnational Legal Ordering of Criminal Justice: Mapping 
the Field (in this issue). 
22.  Halliday & Shaffer 2015a, supra note 8, at 7, 21. 
[2019]  AUSTRALIAN CORPORATE FOREIGN BRIBERY REFORMS 31 
from a new legal realist conception of law,23 they see transnational law as embodying 
norms that are transported across national frontiers via cross-border social 
structures, and which are possibly changed in the process.
A transnational legal order is “a collection of formalized legal norms and 
associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and 
practice of law across national jurisdictions.”24 A TLO may be recorded in an array 
of instruments on the “soft” to “hard” law spectrum;25 it may concern an array of 
socially constructed problems, from the purely domestic to the typically cross-
border;26 and it may change states in their “legal” and “non-legal” dimensions.27
The extent to which change occurs it is likewise a function of a range of factors. 
Some of these factors relate to the character (“legitimacy, clarity, and coherence”) 
of the rules or processes, and others reflect the relative power of the receiving state, 
as well as its domestic circumstances, exposure to intermediaries, and the 
occurrence of “historic events.”28
Either way, the change-making process is not one-way or one-shot, but 
recursive.29 The concept of recursivity “posits that changes and transformations of 
states will be a function of three processes operating concurrently and cyclically – a 
politics within international and transnational lawmaking, a politics within domestic 
lawmaking, and a politics between them.”30 In contrast to Boister, Halliday and 
Shaffer give recursivity a central place in their analysis. 
II. COMPARING THE THEORIES IN A CASE OF FOREIGN BRIBERY REFORM
How do these theories of transnational law compare to each other at the 
global level of anticorruption controls, and how were they compared in this Article 
through the prism of the Australian case? Before discussing my findings on the 
heuristic value of the two approaches, I briefly describe the CCC Bill in its wider 
context, along with my approach to the case analysis.  
A. Approach to the Comparison 
As stated in the Introduction, this Article proceeds from a parallel work in 
which I argued that anticorruption departs, in important respects, from 
transnational criminal law conceptions.31 Within the broader literature on 
international and transnational criminal law, Boister’s conceptualization of TCL has 
contributed significantly to exposing under-theorized and under-researched areas 

23.  Id. at 17. See also Gregory Shaffer, The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law, 28 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 189, 193 (2015); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: 
Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory? 95 CORN. L. R. 61 (2009) [hereinafter Nourse & 
Shaffer 2009]. 
24.  Halliday & Shaffer 2015b, supra note 8, at 475. 
25.  Halliday & Shaffer 2015a, supra note 8, at 16. 
26.  Id. at 7; Shaffer 2013a, supra note 8, at 8. 
27.  Shaffer 2013a, supra note 8, at 11–12; Shaffer 2013b, supra note 8, at 24–33. 
28.  Shaffer 2013b, supra note 8, at 33–46. 
29.  Shaffer 2013a, supra note 8, at 14. 
30.  Id.
31.  Ivory 2018, supra note 1. 
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of state coordination.32 Nonetheless, his framework for TCL is an uneasy fit with 
the diversity of supra-state anticorruption standards and practices. These norms and 
activities have both global and local qualities that escape the transnational criminal 
lawyers’ conceptions of space and their allied concerns about regime legitimacy. 
Further, the treaties could be considered both criminal and regulatory (newly 
governmental), insofar as they require states to adopt administrative and civil 
measures of social control. These non-criminal strategies are praised as pragmatic 
and participatory, though they pose their own normative and practical challenges. 
Finally, suppression conventions are not the only, or necessarily the most important, 
source of supra-state proscription of corrupt behavior. “Anticorruptionism” is 
equally undergirded by international instruments that are non- or internally-binding 
and/or diagnostic in nature.
To address these deficiencies, I argued, it is necessary to situate extant 
conceptions of TCL within a larger set of doctrinal and socio-legal inquiries into 
new forms of global governance. My approach would mandate studies that deploy 
“a combination of sociological, historical, and ecological methods to explore the 
effect of a transnational legal order on corruption within particular countries or 
organisations, and vice-versa.”33
B. Selecting Australia 
To begin that undertaking for this Article, I conducted a desk-based study 
of a proposed federal anticorruption reform in my home jurisdiction, Australia. This 
research forms part of a larger project of inquiry into corporate foreign bribery laws 
in the UK and Australia. The choice of Australia as the case study stems from both 
my existing knowledge of the Australian situation and from Australia’s suitability 
for comparing TCL and TLO approaches.
Australia, it is said, has an ambivalent, if not anxious, relationship with 
international law.34 Under its constitution, Australia is broadly a dualist state, its 
Commonwealth executive concluding agreements at the international level and its 
legislature transposing those obligations in the domestic realm via legislation.35 The 
capacity of the executive to thereby alter the federal balance of power or 
compromise Australian freedom of action (sovereignty) has been a matter of 
controversy as relates to criminal justice. Notoriously, Australian governments 
campaigned for the creation of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC) 
in the 1990s before declaring Australia’s jurisdictional primacy when ratifying the 
Rome Statute in the 2000s.36

32.  Robert Currie, Neil Boister, An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law 13 J. OF INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 1166, 1166–67 (2015); Elies van Sliedregt, International Criminal Law: Over-studied and Underachieving?
29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2016). See also ROGER O’KEEFE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW ¶ 7.204,
at n. 415 (2015).
33.  Ivory 2018, supra note 1, at 438. 
34.  Hilary Charlesworth et al., Deep Anxieties: Australia and the International Legal Order 25 SYD.
L. REV. 422 (2003). 
35.  GABRIELLE APPLEBY ET AL., AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC LAW 347 (2nd ed. 2014). 
36.  HILARY CHARLESWORTH ET AL., NO COUNTRY IS AN ISLAND: AUSTRALIA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 71–80 (2006) [hereinafter CHARLESWORTH ET AL. (2006)]. 
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In turn, the ICC debate is said to reflect Australia’s occasional roles as 
“good international citizen” or “middle power.”37 With these labels, Australia is 
ascribed some scope to act through multilateral institutions and as a norm 
entrepreneur,38 despite its dependence on great power allies. Hence, Australia’s 
reticence with respect to the ICC is partly attributed to its deference to the United 
States, which ultimately refused to join the Court.39 Conversely, in the area of 
anticorruption, Australia has adopted and promoted key international treaties 
favoured by the US, but has been criticized for insufficiently implementing those 
agreements.40
Viewed against this backdrop, the CCC Bill has much to offer as a vehicle 
for comparison. The Bill has the hallmarks of a relatively orderly response to 
international pressure (a la Boister’s theory) and exhibits the more recursive pattern 
of influence predicted by transnational legal process scholars, Halliday and Shaffer.  
C. Background to the CCC Bill 
As put to Parliament by Malcolm Turnbull’s conservative coalition 
government in December 2017, the CCC Bill proposes substantial changes to the 
Australian rules on corporate liability for foreign bribery.41 Since the late 1990s, 
Division 70 Commonwealth Criminal Code (hereinafter Code) has prohibited the 
intentional provision, etc., of illegitimate benefits to “foreign public officials” within 
and outside Australia’s territory.42 Under Part 2.5 Code, a “body corporate” may be 
attributed with the physical elements of an offense that is committed by a corporate 
“employee, agent, or officer.”43 The mental elements are ascribed to a corporation 
who “authorised or permitted” the behavior,44 as determined inter alia by analyzing 
the conduct of its board or “high managerial agent[s]” or assessing the quality of its 
“corporate culture.”45
Though notable for these detailed provisions,46 Part 2.5 still requires the 
prosecutor to prove all the physical and mental elements of an offense, like foreign 
bribery, beyond reasonable doubt.47 Proposed s. 70.5A CCC Bill would depart from 
this position by rendering certain bodies corporate strictly liable for failing to 

37.  Melissa Conley Tyler, et al., Australia’s International Personality: Historical, Legal and Policy 
Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 1 (Emily Crawford & Donald R. Rothwell eds., 3rd 
ed. 2017). 
38.  Id. at 9–11, 18–22; Jason Ralph, The Responsibility to Protect and the Rise of China: Lessons from 
Australia’s Role as a “Pragmatic” Norm Entrepreneur 17 INT’L REL. OF THE ASIA-PAC. 35, 52 (2017) citing 
and discussing ANDREW CARR, WINNING THE PEACE: AUSTRALIA’S CAMPAIGN TO CHANGE THE 
ASIA-PACIFIC (2015). 
39.  CHARLESWORTH ET AL., supra note 36, at 80 (2006). 
40.  See, e.g., Jo-Anne Gilbert & Jason Sharman, Turning a Blind Eye to Bribery: Explaining Failures 
to Comply with the International Anti-Corruption Regime 64 POL. STUDIES 74, 82–86 (2016) (discussing cases 
involving the Australian Wheat Board and two subsidiaries of the Reserve Bank of Australia). 
41.  See, generally, Cat Barker & Monica Biddington, Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting 
Corporate Crime) Bill 2017, Parliamentary Library Bills Digests, No. 105, 2017–18 (2018). 
42.  Code, supra note 10, at §§ 70.1, 70.2, 70.5. 
43.  Id. at § 12.2. 
44.  Id. at § 12.3(1). 
45.  Id. at § 12.3(2). 
46.  CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 102 (2nd ed. 2001). 
47.  Code, supra note 10, at §§ 13.1–13.2. 
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prevent their associates from bribing a foreign public official; to avoid liability a 
defendant firm would have to establish that it had in place procedures adequate to 
prevent the associate’s corruption.48 A minister must publish a guidance for 
corporations on possible preventive measures,49 and corporations may have the 
option of negotiating with prosecutors for a deferred prosecution agreement 
(hereinafter DPA).50
At the time of writing, it was not clear whether and, if so, when the CCC 
Bill would be passed into law. Later in December 2017, the Australian Federal Police 
(hereinafter AFP) and Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (hereinafter 
CDPP) released a “guideline” on corporate self-reporting of foreign bribery.51 In 
June 2018, the Attorney-General opened consultations on a Code of Practice, which 
would complement the DPA scheme in the CCC Bill.52 However, by late 2018, the 
conservative parties had changed their prime minister, and the CCC Bill was 
awaiting debate in Parliament. In contrast, a roughly contemporaneous bill on 
protections for private-sector “whistleblowers” had been read a third time; 
legislation on corporate reporting with respect to “modern slavery” had been 
enacted.53
D. Method of Analysis 
To compare TCL and TLO theories in the Australian case, I undertook a 
content analysis of documents justifying and describing the corporate foreign 
bribery measures in the CCC Bill. My selection of documents was motivated by two 
questions: (1) What were the international, transnational, and domestic influences 
on this proposal for reform? and (2) Is the failing to prevent offense an example of 
criminal, preventive, or “new governance” approaches to behaviour control?
From the domestic sources, I selected three categories of documents to 
review: (1) the Bill itself;54 (2) statements on the Bill and its exposure draft from the 
Attorney-General’s Department (hereinafter AGD);55 and (3) Senate committee 

48.  CCC Bill, supra note 12, at Sch. 1, cl. 8, § 70.5A(5). 
49.  Id. at Sch. 1, cl. 8, § 70.5B. 
50.  Id. at Sch. 2 (proposing amendments to the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983).
51.  AFP & CDPP, Self-Reporting of Foreign Bribery and Related Offending by Corporations (Dec. 8, 
2017) (Austl.), https://www.cdpp.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2061/f/20170812AFP-CDPP-Best-
Practice-Guideline-on-self-reporting-of-foreign-bribery.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2018). 
52.  Media Release, The Hon. Christian Porter MP, Attorney-General, Consultation on New 
Measures to Combat Corporate Crime (Jun. 8, 2018) (Austl.), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Media/ 
Pages/Consultation-on-new-measure-to-combat-corporate-crime-8-june-2018.aspx (last visited Dec. 
22, 2018). 
53.  Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) (Austl.); Treasury Laws Amendment (Enhancing Whistleblower 
Protections) Bill 2018 (Cth) (Austl.). 
54.  Supra note 12. 
55.  See, esp., AGD, Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Bribery Offence in the Criminal Code Act 1995: 
Public Consultation Paper (Apr. 2017) (Austl.), https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Pages/Proposed-
amendments-to-the-foreign-bribery-offence-in-the-criminal-code-act-1995.aspx (last visited Jul. 16, 
2018) [hereinafter AGD, Bribery Consultation Paper]; Explanatory Memorandum, Crimes Legislation Amendment 
(Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter CCC Bill EM]; Senator the Hon. James 
McGrath, Second Reading Speech: Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017,
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate 9906, 9908 (Dec. 6, 2017) (Austl.) [hereinafter CCC 
Bill Second Reading Speech]; AGD, Submission to the Legal & Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, 
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reports on the Bill and the broader topic of foreign bribery.56 As my review 
progressed, I also focused on materials that discussed the failing to prevent offense 
rather than the DPA scheme.
I then cross-checked my reading of the Bill and related AGD documents 
against domestic and international sources. As to the domestic sources, I reviewed 
three years’ of annual reports of the AFP, CDPP and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (hereinafter ASIC) (the corporate regulator) for 
discussion of anti-foreign bribery work bearing on the proposed reform.57 For the 
international materials, I considered OECD and UN monitoring body reports on 

Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combating Corporate Crime) Bill 2017, Sub. No. 7 (undated) (Austl.), 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Af
fairs/CombattingCrime/Submissions (last visited Jul. 16, 2018) [hereinafter AGD, LACALC
Submission]; The Hon. Christian Porter MP, Attorney General, Letter to Senator Helen Polley, Chair, Senate 
Scrutiny of Bills Committee, No. MS18-000369, 10 (Mar. 6, 2018) (Austl.), https://www.aph.gov.au/ 
senate_scrutiny_digest (last visited Jul. 19, 2018) [hereinafter AG, Letter to Sen. Polley]; AGD, Response:
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee: Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate 
Crime) Bill 2017: Questions on Notice (Mar. 7, 2018) (Austl.), https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_
Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/CombattingCrime/Additional_Doc
uments (last visited Jul. 16, 2018) [hereinafter AGD, LACALC Response (Mar. 2018)].
56.  See, esp., Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Crimes Legislation 
Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 Report (Apr. 2018) (Austl.), 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Af
fairs/CombattingCrime (last visited Jul. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Senate, LACALC Bill Report]; Senate, 
Economic References Committee, Foreign Bribery: Report (Mar. 2018) (Austl.), 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Foreignbribery4
5th/Report (last visited Jul. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Senate, ERC Report].
57.  The reports are available at https://www.afp.gov.au/about-us/publications-and-reports/ 
annual-reports (AFP), https://www.cdpp.gov.au/publications (CDPP), and https://asic.gov.au/ 
about-asic/corporate-publications/asic-annual-reports (ASIC) (all last visited Dec. 26, 2018). See, further, 
infra note 113. 
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Australia,58 the UK59 and US.60 As relevant, I drew on UK and US corporate foreign 
bribery laws and associated guidelines on compliance and sentencing.
Analysis of the selected texts yielded data relevant to the research questions 
in clusters of themes. Using and refining related key words, I searched the PDF 
documents manually, extracting relevant passages, and organizing the extracts. 
Through this process, important texts were identified for a second round of data 
extraction, in which the steps were repeated and larger passages taken out and 
coded.
III. TCL AND TLO THEORY IN THE AUSTRALIAN CASE
The content analysis yielded two main answers to the question: How do 
TCL and TLO theory perform when applied to a specific case of anticorruption 
reform? The findings of the analysis are grouped around the concepts of 
“transnational law” (Part III(A)) and “criminal law” (Part III(B)) in what follows.

58.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Working Group on Bribery 
in International Business Transactions [hereinafter OECD-WGB], AUSTRALIA: REVIEW OF THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION (1999) [hereinafter OECD-
WGB, AU-PH1]; OECD-WGB, AUSTRALIA: PHASE 2 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Jan. 4, 2006) [hereinafter OECD-WGB, AU-PH2];
OECD-WGB, AUSTRALIA: PHASE 2 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHASE
2 RECOMMENDATIONS, APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF 
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997
RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Aug. 
29, 2009); OECD-WGB, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN AUSTRALIA (Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter OECD-WGB, AU-PH3]; OECD-WGB,
AUSTRALIA: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 3, 2015) 
[hereinafter OECD-WGB, AU-PH3-FU]; OECD-WGB, PHASE 4 REPORT: AUSTRALIA (Dec. 15, 2017) 
[hereinafter OECD-WGB, AU-PH4], http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsonthe 
implementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.html (last visited Jul.–Sep. 2018). 
59.  See, esp., OECD-WGB, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 1TER REPORT ON THE APPLICATION
OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND 2009 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Dec. 16, 2010) [hereinafter OECD-WGB, 
UK-PH1TER]; OECD-WGB, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Mar. 17, 2005) [hereinafter OECD-WGB, UK-PH2];
OECD-WGB, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2BIS REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter OECD-WGB, UK-PH2BIS];
OECD-WGB, UNITED KINGDOM: PHASE 2BIS FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE PHASE 2BIS RECOMMENDATIONS (May 23, 2011) [hereinafter OECD-WGB, UK-PH2BIS-FU].
60.  See, esp., OECD-WGB, UNITED STATES: PHASE 2 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter OECD-WGB, US-PH2]; OECD-
WGB, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter OECD-WGB, US-PH3].
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A. “Transnational Law” and the Proposed Australian Reforms 
The first finding concerns the extent to which the proposed Australian 
corporate foreign bribery offense conforms to TCL or TLO pictures of 
transnational law. In the parallel article just described, I found that supra-state 
anticorruption laws depart, in subtle but significant ways, from Boister’s concept of 
norms that cross borders.61 In the Australian case, the corporate failing to prevent 
offense would “transcend national frontiers”62 insofar as the putative bribe-taker is 
a “foreign public official” to Australia and the Commonwealth’s geographical 
jurisdiction is extended beyond Australian territory.63 The new crime also appears 
to implement Australia’s duties to criminalize foreign bribery, hold legal persons 
responsible, and punish entities for wrongs under the OECD and UN 
Conventions.64 The OECD treaty is cited in the literature, moreover, as the prima
facie output of a global prohibition regime due to its close association with the US 
and its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (hereinafter FCPA).65 The Turnbull 
government recalled the international consensus when it described foreign bribery 
as injurious due to its effect on communities, business, and markets.66 All that said, 
with the failing to prevent offense, Australia would appear to be responding to soft 
instruments, as well as changes in other “Anglo” countries and other agentic and 
structural drivers.
1. International Standards and Statements 
For a start, neither the OECD Convention nor the UN Convention 
requires Australia to criminalize corporate failures to prevent foreign bribery. The 
treaties are silent on the rules for attributing guilt to legal persons other than to say 
that state parties shall take measures “in accordance” or “consistent with [their] legal 
principles.”67 Commentary suggests that the treaties were designed to accommodate 
the traditional reluctance of some states to recognize the criminal responsibility of 
legal persons.68
Instead, the idea that corporations should be held liable for foreign bribery 
through managerial omission is mentioned in a non-binding 2009 OECD 

61.  Ivory 2018, supra note 1, at 423–27. 
62.  PHILLIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW: STORRS LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 2 (1956).
63.  CCC Bill, supra note 12, at Sch. 1, cl. 8, § 70.2 & 70.5A(1)(b). The definition of foreign 
public official under § 70.1 Code includes persons formally or functionally associated with foreign 
states, foreign governments, and public international organizations, as well as intermediaries of those 
persons.
64. See AGD, Bribery Consultation Paper, supra note 55, at 9; CCC Bill, Second Reading Speech, 
supra note 55, at 9908 (governmental references suggesting the CCC Bill’s compliance with the 
conventions in general). See also CCC Bill EM, supra note 55, at ¶ 7. 
65.  Pub. L. No. 95–213 (1977), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1. See, further, Kenneth Abbott & Duncan 
Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against Corruption, 31 J. OF L. STUD. S141, 
S154 (2002); ANDREAS & NADELMANN 2006, supra note 18, at 55–56. 
66.  CCC Bill EM, supra note 55, at ¶ 6; CCC Bill Second Reading Speech, supra note 55, at 9906. 
See also AGD, Bribery Consultation Paper, supra note 55, at 1. 
67.  OECD Convention, supra note 9, at Art. 2; UN Convention, supra note 9, at Art. 26. 
68.  Mark Pieth, Article 2: The Responsibility of Legal Persons, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON 
BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 212, 223 & 225 (Mark Pieth et al., eds., 2nd ed. 2014). 
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Recommendation on the implementation of Art. 2 OECD Convention.69
According to Annex I of the 2009 Recommendation, member states should ensure 
that their legal systems allow corporations to be held responsible for the crimes of 
a range of associated actors, including senior leaders who fail to prevent bribery at 
“lower level[s].”70 Previously, the European Commission had utilized a similar 
concept to harmonize member state rules on corporate liability for certain forms of 
economic malfeasance affecting the European Union.71 More recently, G20 leaders 
borrowed and broadened the language in the OECD’s Annex I in their 2017 High-
Level Principles on the Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption.72
Numerous international and non-governmental organizations (hereinafter 
NGOs) complement these state-to-state standards by telling companies themselves 
what they should do to ensure compliance with anti-bribery laws. For example, the 
AGD intends to be informed by “ISO 37001” as well as a joint OECD, UN, and 
World Bank handbook that, in turn, purports to digest six other “internationally 
recognised business instruments on anti-bribery.”73 Given this diversity, it cannot 
be assumed that the OECD or UN Convention is the actual or analytical “match” 
for the proposed Australian rule. It could also be that Australia responded to a wider 
understanding—even an emerging general legal principle or custom—on the 
optimal interpretation of international corporate criminal liability obligations. 
Further, neither the international anticorruption watchdogs nor the federal 
government presents the failing to prevent offence as necessary for Australian 
compliance with treaty law. Both the UN Implementation Review Mechanism and 
the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions 
(hereinafter OECD-WGB) depict Australia as having adequately transposed the 
conventions’ articles on the criminalization of bribery and corporate liability. The 
difficulties lie with Australia’s enforcement of its existing legislation. For example, 
in its Phase 1 review, the OECD-WGB endorsed Australia’s legal framework for 

69.  OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, Annex I, C(2009)159/REV1/FINAL (Nov. 26, 2009) 
as amended by C(2010)19 (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter OECD, 2009 Recommendation].
70.  Id. at ¶ B(b), third intent. 
71.  Second Protocol, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the treaty on European Union, 
to the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Jun. 19, 1997, 
1997 O.J. (C 221), Jul. 19, 1997, 12, Art. 3(2) (requiring states to ensure the liability of legal persons 
where lack of supervision or control by senior persons made possible fraud, active corruption, or money 
laundering, as defined). See also Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal 
law, Jul. 5, 2017, 2017 O.J. (L 198), Jul. 28, 2017, 29, Art. 6(2). 
72.  G20, Leaders’ Declaration: Shaping an Interconnected World, Annex: G20 High-Level 
Principles on the Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption, 8 Jul. 2017, 
https://www.g20germany.de/Webs/G20/EN/G20/Summit_documents/summit_documents_node.
html, principle 4. For example, whereas the OECD would have states take a flexible approach to the 
status of the triggering person, the G20 would have them make the relevant status flexible or disregard 
status entirely. 
73.  AGD, LACALC Response (Mar. 2018), supra note 55, at 12 citing International Organization 
for Standardization [hereinafter ISO], 2016, ISO 37001: Anti-Bribery Management Systems – 
Requirements with Guidance for Use, https://www.iso.org/standard/65034.html and OECD, 
UNODC, and World Bank Group, Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Handbook for Business 15 (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-corruption-ethics-and-compliance-handbook-for-business.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2018). See also Senate, ERC Report, supra note 56, at ¶ 4.76. 
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prohibiting foreign bribery and attributing guilt to corporations.74 In Phase 2, the 
OECD-WGB praised “section 12 [as] ambitious and progressive,” if untested.75
Only from Phase 3 did the examiners express “serious[] concer[n]” with Australia’s 
low rate of enforcement.76 The Phase 4 report, which was released less than two 
weeks after the CCC Bill, stops short of describing the provisions as necessary, 
though it “welcome[s]” the failing to prevent offense as an attempt to remove 
“barriers” to prosecution and “recommend[s] . . . follow-up on . . . enact[ment].”77
The UN reviewers have not had an opportunity to report on the proposed 
Australian offense, but they endorsed a related UK model in a review of British 
implementation of Art. 26 UN Convention.78
Australian government documents echo this narrative by asserting that 
Australia has already executed its international obligations79 and that the s. 70.5A 
offense would “[go] beyond the requirements of the [OECD] Convention.”80 On 
this account, all changes in the Bill would enhance the Commonwealth’s capacity to 
enforce international and domestic norms against foreign bribery, particularly with 
respect to companies in corporate groups and transnational supply chains.81
2. Anglo-American Precedents 
In addition, when selecting the failing to prevent offense, Australia would 
appear to have followed an Anglo-American precedent that was, not so much 
required, but recommended and perhaps extended through international 
instruments and processes. Already in the early 2000s, the OECD had described the 
general US federal corporate criminal attribution rules as “reinforc[ing] the 
effectiveness of the FCPA [and] also encourag[ing] corporations to implement 
measures of deterrence throughout their organisations.”82 The FCPA’s bribery 
offense may be committed by legal persons,83 who are strictly vicariously liable, at 

74.  OECD-WGB, AU PH-1, supra note 58, at 23. 
75.  OECD-WGB, AU-PH2, supra note 58, at ¶ 2, 148–53 (incl. recommendation). 
76.  OECD-WGB, AU-PH3, supra note 58, at ¶ 7, 42–43. See also AU-PH3-FU, supra note 58, at 
¶ 2 (noting an increase in the number of investigations, but still only one prosecution for which 
reporting was then suppressed). 
77. OECD-WGB, AU-PH4, supra note 58, at ¶ 153–54. 
78.  CONFERENCE OF THE STATE PARTIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST CORRUPTION [hereinafter UNCAC-COSP], IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW GROUP, COUNTRY
REVIEW REPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, ¶ 32 & 48 (2013), http://www.unodc.org/ 
unodc/treaties/CAC/country-profile/CountryProfile.html?code=GBR (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). See
also UNCAC-COSP, IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW GROUP, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: AUSTRALIA,
CAC/COSP/IRG/I/2/1, 3 (2012). 
79.  AGD, Bribery Consultation Paper, supra note 55, at 3; CCC Bill EM, supra note 55, at ¶ 7. See
also Senate, LACALC Bill Report, supra note 56, at ¶ 1.3. 
80.  AGD, LACALC Submission, supra note 55, at 7. 
81.  CCC Bill EM, supra note 55, at ¶ 7–8; AGD, LACALC Response (Mar. 2018), supra note 55, 
at 2–3; AGD, LACALC Submission, supra note 55, at 7. See also AGD, Bribery Consultation Paper, supra
note 55, at 8–9; OECD-WGB, AU-PH4, supra note 58, at ¶ 153–54; Senate, LACALC Bill Report, supra
note 56, at ¶ 2.85–2.86. 
82.  OECD-WGB, US-PH2, supra note 60, at ¶ 15 (Oct. 2002). See also OECD-WGB, US-PH3,
supra note 60, at ¶ 98. 
83.  See, generally, Rahul Kohli, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1269, 1280–82 
(2018).
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common law, for an employee acting “within the scope and nature of his 
employment[] and . . . at least in part, to benefit the corporation.”84 There is no 
defense that the corporation prohibited misconduct with internal policies and 
procedures.85 Nevertheless, US courts may reduce financial penalties for firms with 
“effective compliance and ethics program[s].”86 Prosecutors should consider “the 
existence and effectiveness of . . . pre-existing compliance program[s]” when 
making charging and negotiation decisions.87 Corporations are afforded “insights” 
into the “hallmarks of effective compliance practice” via a non-binding 
prosecutorial guidance document.88
Back at the OECD, by the start of the 2010s, the Working Group had 
endorsed a similar UK offense, defense, and guidance model,89 after having been 
highly critical of prior British laws.90 Section 7 Bribery Act 2010 (UK) made it a crime 
for “commercial organisation[s]” to fail to prevent bribery by an “associated 
person,” defined in s. 8 to include an “employee, agent or subsidiary.”91 Liability 
under s. 7 Bribery Act 2010 (UK) is no-fault (strict) but the organization has a defense 
if it can show that it had implemented procedures adequate to prevent bribery.92
Adequate procedures are discussed further in a non-binding guidance issued by the 
Ministry of Justice under s. 9.93 Separate legislation establishes a system of DPAs 
for corporations that were, or commit to become, compliant, amongst other 
things.94 Therefore, the UK would seem to have created a corporate anti-foreign 
bribery framework that is broadly similar to the US model, albeit via a strict 
organizational offense, adequate procedures defense, and negotiated settlement 
scheme. Whilst the transnational origins of the UK scheme is beyond this Article’s 
scope, it is at least interesting to note that British examiners had participated in the 
Phase 2 and 3 OECD reviews of the US.95
Returning to Australia, both the OECD and the AGD acknowledge that 
proposed s. 70.5A is “similar to” the offense in s. 7 Bribery Act 2010 (UK),96 if not 

84.  See, generally, Blake Weiner, et al., Corporate Criminal Liability, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 961, 964–
65 (2018). 
85.  Weiner et al., Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 84, at 966, 968. 
86.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2018) §§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5(f) (2018). 
87.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL, §§ 9-28.300 (2018). 
88.  CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF’T DIV., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, 57–65 (2015). 
89.  See, esp., OECD-WGB, UK-PH1TER, supra note 59, at ¶ 79–80, 83; OECD-WGB, UK-
PH2BIS-FU, supra note 59, at ¶ 2. 
90.  OECD-WGB, UK-PH2, supra note 59, at ¶ 195–206; OECD-WGB, UK-PH2BIS, supra note
59, at 4, ¶ 65–92. 
91.  Bribery Act 2010, § 8(1) & (3) (Eng.). 
92.  Id. at § 7(2). 
93.  Id. at § 9; Ministry of Justice, Guidance about Procedures which Relevant Commercial 
Organisations Can Put into Place to Prevent Persons Associated with Them from Bribing (Eng.) (Mar. 
2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bribery-act-2010-guidance (last visited Feb. 27, 
2018).
94.  Crime and Courts Act 2013, Sch. 17 (Eng.); SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, DEFERRED
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS CODE OF PRACTICE: CRIME AND COURTS ACT 2013, Feb. 14, 2014, ¶ 
2.8.1(iii), 2.8.2(iii), 7.10(iii), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/?wpdmdl=1447 (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
95.  OECD-WGB, US-PH2, supra note 59, at ¶ 2; OECD-WGB, US-PH3, supra note 59, at ¶ 6. 
96.  CCC Bill Second Reading Speech, supra note 55, at 9907; AGD, LACALC Response (Mar. 
2018), supra 55, at 3; AGD, LACALC Submission, supra note 55, at 7; OECD-WGB, AU-PH4, supra note 
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“modeled on” that provision.97 The AGD cites both the UK “guidance” and US 
Department of Justice compliance questionnaire among the standards it shall 
consider when devising the Australian compliance principles under s. 70.5B CCC 
Bill.98 Its proposed DPA regime is “consistent with” and a “hybrid of” US and UK 
practice.99
3. Australian and Multinational Drivers 
Looking finally from text to subtext, the CCC Bill shows signs of influence 
from other less public international actors and factors than predominate in the TCL 
model. First, the Bill appears to be a means for government to maintain status and 
meet evolving demands for performance of sovereign functions. Thus, the AGD 
describes its review of the Code as “appropriate” given that “[i]t has been 18 years 
since the foreign bribery offence was introduced” and there is a need “to ensure 
[that] the law reflects community expectations and does not present unnecessary 
barriers to effective prosecution.”100 Discussing the final version of the Bill, the 
executive describes foreign bribery as a danger to Australia’s “reputation” and 
“international standing,” amongst other things.101 The documents do not mention 
any particular source of threat to Australia’s relative position; however, the country’s 
performance on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index had 
suffered in previous years.102 An earlier governmental press release mentioned that 
NGO’s rankings in connection with Australia’s pride in its “position and 
reputation . . . as one of the least corrupt countries in the world.”103
Second, the surrounding documents indicate that the AGD detected 
support for the failing to prevent offense among multinational businesses within 
Australia’s jurisdiction. For example, when discussing the s. 70.5B guidance, the 
AGD notes that benchmarking against the UK governmental compliance guidelines 
“is in line with the preference Australian industry expressed during the 2017 
consultation process and will ensure minimal impact on Australian corporations 
that have already framed their anti-bribery policies on international guidelines.”104
In other statements, the AGD indicates that standardized compliance requirements 

58, at ¶ 153. See also AGD, Bribery Consultation Paper, supra note 55, at 8. 
97.  AGD, LACALC Submission, supra note 55, at 4. 
98.  AGD, LACALC Response (Mar. 2018), supra note 55, at 12. 
99.  Id. at 26, 35; AGD, LACALC Submission, supra note 55, at 3, 12. See also CCC Bill EM, supra
note 55, at 9907. 
100.  AGD, Bribery Consultation Paper, supra note 55, at 3. 
101.  CCC Bill EM, supra note 55, at ¶ 6; CCC Bill Second Reading Speech, supra note 55, at 
9906. See also AGD, Bribery Consultation Paper, supra note 55, at 1, 9. 
102.  See, e.g., Media Release: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2017 Shows Australia Falls again in 
Corruption Perceptions Index Scores, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL AUSTRALIA,
http://transparency.org.au/corruption-perceptions-index-cpi-2017-shows-australia-falls-corruption-
perceptions-index-scores (last visited Sep. 5, 2018). 
103.  Media Release, The Hon. Michael Keenan MP, Minister for Justice, AFP-Hosted Anti-
Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre (Jul. 31, 2014) (Austl.), 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/143276/20141001-1307/www.ministerjustice.gov.au/Mediareleases/
Pages/2014/ThirdQuarter/31July2014-AFPHostedFraudAndAntiCorruptionCentre.html (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2018). 
104.  AGD, LACALC Response (Mar. 2018), supra note 55, at 12. 
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would confer efficiency gains (rather than impose compliance burdens) on 
Australian firms, which “operat[e] overseas.”105 Multinational businesses, in other 
words, would need to make a lesser investment of resources to gain equal or greater 
confidence that their internal systems and procedures meet the Australian standards. 
The Senate Economics References Committee, somewhat by contrast, recorded 
private sector concern about the strict liability offense in proposed s. 70.5A CCC 
Bill. However, the Committee ultimately formed the view that the burden of proof 
was justified by the compliance defense and the alignment with longstanding UK 
practice.106
Third, the materials reflect ideas about crime and corporations that predate 
or parallel the OECD Convention and anticorruptionism. Hence, the CCC Bill is 
said to address “serious corporate crime.” That category is described by reference 
to the complexity, opacity, and sophistication of its offenses (and offenders), as well 
as the cross-border qualities of its investigations.107 The nomenclature of 
“seriousness”, as used in the UK, is connected to broader trends towards preventive 
approaches to justice, which are discussed below.108 Further, there is a history in 
Australian federal law of corporate liability norms being addressed to the perceived 
difficulties of attributing mental states to “modern” business organizations. Already 
in the early 1990s, less hierarchical corporate structures and greater use of delegation 
were judged to inhibit the identification of individuals who were sufficiently senior 
to enable the imputation of guilt to companies.109 Moreover, it was recognized that 
particular organizational (“corporate”) cultures could tacitly authorize a wrong.110
Part 2.5 Code was a reaction to these concerns. But, for extreme and “difficult to 
detect” dangers, it was always the intention of the Code’s drafters that the burden 
of proof could be reversed and liability thereby extended.111
4. Theorizing Transnational Law Reforms 
To summarize, there are interesting questions to be asked about the cross-
border qualities of Australia’s proposed “failing to prevent” offense. However, 
these questions are not only about the alignment of domestic and international 
standards in the abstract, or the formation of the global rules through a prohibition 
regime. Of equal concern are the actual processes by which international 
organizations, foreign states, and other factors and actors contributed to the choice 
of reform – and whether, when, and in what final form that choice will be enacted.
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Clearly, the AGD responded to OECD critique when it opted to overhaul 
Division 70 Code. However, the OECD-WGB’s criticism concerned Australia’s 
relative lack of anti-bribery investigations and prosecutions – not the duty to 
criminalize corporate foreign bribery, with which it had pronounced Australia 
compliant. When choosing the failure to prevent offense, moreover, the AGD 
borrowed a British model, with its OECD influences and echoes of US law. It 
appears to have adopted an Anglo-American hybrid, but one with some basis in 
international standards as these have changed over time. Probing further, proposed 
s. 70.5A CCC Bill resonates with older governmental understandings of the nature 
of both “serious” and “corporate” crime, as well as the (perceived) expectations of 
multinational companies and more diffuse notions of national reputation and 
modern corporate moral hazards.
While these conclusions are not incompatible with the transnational 
criminal approach of Boister, they are better illuminated by Halliday and Shaffer’s 
theory of transnational legal ordering. An avowedly sociolegal and process-oriented 
conception of transnational law avoids the need for analytical matching between 
domestic and international rules, such as is complicated by the diversity of sources 
on corporate foreign bribery. From the TLO view, the issues become: To what 
extend were the OECD and UN Conventions the inspiration for the proposed 
Australian rules? To what extent did specific international peer review procedures 
prompt Australian action, compared to more diffuse international norms about the 
state-of-the-art in domestic corporate foreign bribery legislation?
Next, the core TLO hypothesizes—that transnational law-making is 
recursive—has more heuristic power in revealing and unpacking the messy 
motivations for reform, which are apparent in the Australian case. A recursivity 
approach would problematize the internal processes of decision-making within the 
OECD and UN, US and UK, as well as capture factors native to Australia and the 
interactions between these “levels” of law-making institutions. It could raise 
questions, for example, about how the UK came to adopt the failing to prevent 
model; how the OECD or US influenced the British (or visa-versa); and whether 
Australia contributed to OECD, US, or UK preferences with its earlier “corporate 
culture” rules.112 Other issues that would come to the fore when adopting the TLO 
approach would be the medium of influence between the UK, US, and Australia: 
Was the OECD the “active ingredient” or an epiphenomenon of colonial histories, 
common law traditions, and ongoing political, economic, and security ties? Already 
there are reports of anticorruption networks amongst law enforcement officials of 
“like-minded countries,” the UK, US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.113
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Further, TLO theory provides greater scope for considering the role of 
non-state actors in transnational criminal justice. On the one hand, the Australian 
materials hinted at the role of NGO indictors in shaping perceptions of states as 
more or less corrupt.114 On the other, the materials signalled the importance of 
perceived business preferences for local laws that reflect emerging de-nationalized 
standards. This is not to point to an international commercial conspiracy in 
Australia. Nor is it to downplay the role of the state and, within states, the interests 
of law-enforcers or more obviously “moral” norm entrepreneurs, like NGOs, in 
harmonized or amended laws.115 The claim, rather, is that researchers need to 
consider the ways in which business actors contribute to a choice of crime control 
and transpose international crime-fighting obligations. 116 Here too a recursive lens 
may be apt. For example, which national or international notions of “adequate 
procedures” or “effective compliance” have Australian companies internalized? 
Where did those conceptions originate and to what extent are such private 
transpositions affecting public and/or non-state understandings of “best practice”? 
Do they align with, or do they depart from, each other?  
Finally, TLO theory is better suited to placing internationally salient law 
reforms in their local historical contexts. In the Australian case, a TLO lens would 
prompt an examination of Australia’s past failures to enforce its foreign bribery 
laws, as well as any future failure of the legislature to pass the CCC Bill into law. 
TLO theory affords this additional explanatory power because it is prompts 
questions about whether norms have been institutionalized within states and how 
those rules have impacted human behavior. TCL theory does conceive of 
transnational law as the product of an international process of regime formation 
that affects people through domestic law. However, Boister’s account does not lend 
itself to a focus on the ways that states implement international rules, or the strength 
and weakness of those rules in aligning social practice. My first finding is therefore 
that TCL theory is comparatively less able to expose and account for variations in 
how states and non-state actors respond to international standards. 
B. “Criminal Law” and the Proposed Australian Reforms 
My second finding concerns the challenge of applying the concept of 
transnational criminal law with respect to the proposed Australian corporate foreign 
bribery controls. Is the failing to prevent offense an example of a criminal approach 
to behaviour control and, if not, why should this matter?  
In recent work, Boister acknowledges that the suppression conventions 
also recommend or require non-criminal forms of intervention: civil and 
administrative, “preventive and regulatory.”117 Yet his attention remains on the 
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criminal law—implicitly conceived of as a relatively discrete system of prohibitions, 
procedures, and punishments with particular risks of stigmatization and coercion.118
This focus would appear to be justified insofar as all but one of the anticorruption 
treaties require states to criminalize certain behaviors.119 The crime control treaties 
also authorize incursions into the private sphere and encourage states to reduce 
protections for persons subject to international judicial cooperation.120 Be this as it 
may, notionally non-criminal measures against corruption may also be a source of 
tension or conflict with individual civil liberties.121 The non-criminal features of the 
anticorruption treaties may indicate an alternative approach to behavior control.122
The Australian case materials indicate that there are “new” or “non-criminal” 
qualities to the failure to prevent offense that are central to its categorization, 
historicization, and appraisal.
1. An Example of “New Governance”? 
From one angle, the proposed Australian corporate foreign bribery 
reforms take a stance on criminalization that is characteristic of “new governance” 
approaches to business risk regulation.123 The term “new” (“regulatory” or 
“experimental”) governance describes a broad range of public sector “tools” 
deployed to motivate private sector self-regulation and cooperation in community 
problem-solving.124 Criminal sanctions are not disregarded in this conceptual 
framework and mode of intervention, but they are placed towards the tip of a 
regulatory pyramid.125 There, they serve to deal with more egregious violations and 
to motivate compliance with less coercive enforcement activities.126
Read with the surrounding documents, the CCC Bill recalls this 
collaborative and staged approach to governmental intervention. Granted: the 
AGD rejects a suggestion that the failing to prevent offense is a “regulatory breach” 
that should attract lesser penalties.127 Proposed s. 70.5A is to be made punishable 
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with a fine equal to that in s. 70.2 Code128 so as to “ensure . . . deterre[nce]” of 
willful blindness in companies.129 However, by its terms, s. 70.5A would excuse 
corporations that “had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent” foreign 
bribery. The government will tell corporations the steps they may take,130 using 
“principles-based” guidance rather than a “prescriptive checklist”131 that establishes 
a presumption of (non-)compliance.132 The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Legislation Committee, which examined the Bill in 2018, recommended that 
“corporate stakeholders” be permitted to comment on an exposure draft of the 
“adequate procedures” guidance.133 The very opportunities for self-governance 
justify the no-fault offense,134 the reversal of the burden of proof,135 and the broad 
concept of associates.136
2. The Prospects and Pitfalls of New Governance 
Considered as an example of new governance approaches, the CCC Bill 
could entail regulatory risks and returns other than just those emphasized by Boister. 
For its advocates, new governance is an innovative response to socio-economic 
complexities, “a third-way vision between unregulated markets and top-down 
government controls.”137 Viewed in this way, the Bill provides an adequate 
procedures defense as means to motivate compliance. The DPA scheme is an 
alternative to punishing past acts of foreign bribery through corporate conviction 
and monetary sanctions. The AGD acknowledges that lengthy court battles are an 
economic cost for defendant companies, whilst indictments may themselves create 
possibly fatal corporate stigmas.138 The CCC Bill offers an alternative to that top-
down enforcement model insofar as proposed s. 70.5A would motivate corporate 
harm prevention, and the DPA provisions would allow the deferment of corporate 
prosecutions in exchange inter alia for compliance reforms.139 On an appreciative 
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assessment, this “carrot and stick” approach maximizes opportunities for ethical 
expression within for-profit organizations and minimizes the threat to communities 
from corrupt enterprises – and overzealous prosecutors. The CCC Bill may thus 
respond to the complexity of cross-border corporate regulation in ways that utilize 
private resources or expertise, and reduce the costs or risks of enforcement.
Equally, the scheme could be liable to elite manipulation of various sorts, 
such as emerges from a contemporary Australian corporate governance inquiry, and 
is evident in the international academic literature. Within Australia, there has been 
high-level disapproval of conciliatory corporate regulatory practices in the interim 
report of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation, 
and Financial Services Industry (hereinafter Hayne Royal Commission).140 Prepared 
by a retired High Court judge on the basis of televised witness testimony and major 
institutional disclosures, the report does blame financial services entities themselves 
for misconduct and poor behavior.141 However, the Commissioner also 
provisionally concluded that Australian corporate and prudential regulators had 
enabled improper industry practices by being too reticent to prosecute contested 
allegations of wrongdoing.142 ASIC, in particular, was criticized for prioritizing the 
commercial interest in reaching agreement over the public interest in penalty 
proceedings.143
Within the academy, legal sociologists, political scientists, and criminal 
lawyers problematize compliance approaches to corporate ethics controls. First, 
Lauren Edelman illustrates some of the functional problems with her studies of 
American anti-discrimination law. Through a process of “legal endogeneity”, she 
argues, corporations have used ambiguous legal provisions to shape judicial 
understandings of compliance in their favor.144 She sees a similar process at work 
within US corporate criminal liability and ethics rules,145 as have been influential in 
the transnational regulations on foreign bribery. Applying her insights, it could be 
argued that the defense of “adequate procedures” is overly broad, as it appears in 
proposed s. 70.5A CCC Bill. The breadth (ambiguity) of that concept would not 
likely be moderated by a guidance that is also general (“principles-based”) and 
developed with input from the corporate sector. Moreover, if US practice is any 
guide, the concept of adequate procedures will be interpreted, not by courts, as a 
rule, but by prosecutors and defendants in negotiations for settlements (DPAs).146
To the extent that DPAs result from executive discretion and a process of 
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bargaining, one could hypothesize greater potential for prosecutorial 
accommodation of corporate preferences. The question would then become: To 
what extent is the risk of legal endogeneity offset by prosecutorial codes of practice 
and review procedures as proposed in Australia? 
Second, deploying Foucault, Baker, Liss, and Sharman configure 
compliance activities as a form of governmentality147 or technique of governance 
(surveillance).148 Taking this view of the CCC Bill, corporate duties of care shift 
some of the state’s responsibility for policing onto organizations, which then 
become instruments for monitoring “dangerous” populations of employees, 
contractors, and intermediaries, and encouraging, among them, greater self-
control.149 This style of account is not explicitly normative but it does encourage 
critical reflection on the “contemporary scheme of things,”150 its underlying 
assumptions and effect on social relations. In the case of the CCC Bill, a 
“knowledge-power” lens could prompt inquiry into the logic and impact of 
corporate foreign bribery laws that favor compliance. Could the failing to prevent 
offense reflect a neo-liberal rationality, in that it utilizes profit driven-actors and 
market processes to achieve a public ethical good? How do transnational 
compliance obligations affect the distribution of risk for wrongdoing between small 
and large businesses in exporting states, like Australia? To what extent do privatized 
corporate surveillance duties actually enhance economic freedoms and other forms 
of autonomy in Australia’s globally southern trading partners?151
Critical versions of criminology have also struck a chord with domestic 
criminal lawyers. In this way, third, Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner 
problematize the trend away from fault-based punishment towards coercive harm 
reduction strategies in England and Wales.152 Such “preventive justice” measures 
may have a justification in the need to ensure community safety. However, they 
must be carefully reconciled with liberal protective principles, in those authors’ 
views.153 So far, Ashworth accepts s. 7 Bribery Act 2010, despite the private 
performance of public functions and criminalization of omissions that it foresees.154
However, his earlier argumentation (with Zedner) was deployed to query the strict 
nature of the failing to prevent offense in at least one academic response to the CCC 
Bill when it was issued as a consultation draft.155
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3. Theorizing Non-Criminal Law Reforms 
How would TLO theory, in contrast to TCL theory, accommodate these 
alternative characterizations and critiques of the Australian failing to prevent 
offense? In light of the above, I argue that a TLO approach is better suited to 
illuminating the qualities and consequences of the CCC Bill, if it is passed.  
The advantage of TLO theory here is its analytical openness. Belonging to 
the “contextualist” branch of the New Legal Realist tradition, TLO theory departs 
from the “Jamesian/Deweyan” position that “theory must come from the 
world.”156 Hence, scholars deploying the TLO approach do not privilege criminal 
law as the most important means by which societies approach transnational criminal 
problems.157 Further, unlike transnational criminal lawyers, TLO theorists do not 
provide a framework for evaluating transnational legal orders as such.158 Instead, 
they emphasize the perceived legitimacy of a law as a variable in compliance,159 as 
well as the way that “ideological contradictions” within a TLO can spark recursive 
processes, which affect the settlement of legal meanings and practices.160
Neutrality vis-à-vis legal taxonomies and fundamental rights enables a 
reform, like the CCC Bill, to be both described and appraised from a wider range 
of perspectives. British failing to prevent offenses do raise due process issues for 
corporations and their workers, even if they are judged acceptable within the 
attendant frameworks of international human rights law and criminal procedure.161
Defendants’ rights are also an important constraint on the enforcement of foreign 
bribery law in Australia, as a recent High Court case has shown.162 However, as 
emerges from the above, there is a range of pragmatic and normative challenges 
embedded in the CCC Bill, which TCL’s focus on the criminal law and procedures 
may conceal. TLO theory may perform better if it is used to illuminate how 
measures affect and are perceived by relevant groups, from corporate compliance 
officers and sales personnel to the legal and allied professionals who act as 
investigators and advisors. That information could aid reflections on the reasons 
for the adoption or rejection of the CCC Bill and, if it is adopted, could help 
determine the CCC Act’s “regulatory performance.”163
In addition, TLO and TCL approaches could be combined to probe the 
operation—for good or for ill—of anti-foreign bribery compliance systems. Such 
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studies could start, for instance, with questions about how companies subject to the 
CCC Bill (or an equivalent law) respond to their duties to prevent, both on paper 
and through their internal and external counsel and compliance functions. They 
could then continue to probe how firms discharge their quasi-law enforcement 
powers (e.g., in trainings and internal investigations) and how those exercises of 
power are perceived by employees, agents, and contractors in Australia and a range 
of countries that host Australian investments. These findings could illuminate new 
opportunities for individual ethical expression or possibilities for domination, when 
viewed through a liberal-criminal law or a knowledge-power lens.
CONCLUSION
What do the findings in the Australian case say about the relative strengths 
of TCL or TLO theories? Does Boister’s “TCL” theory deliver on its promise to 
match explanatory, descriptive, and normative accounts of transnational crime 
controls? To the extent that there are difficulties, how does Halliday and Shaffer’s 
“TLO” approach correct the problems with the TCL analysis?
In this Article, I explored these questions via a preliminary study of a 
proposed corporate foreign bribery reform in Australia. Through a structured 
reading of Australian government documents and associated international materials, 
I found that the transnational criminal account struggles to capture the complex 
history and ambiguous form of the proposed Australian failing to prevent offense. 
On the one hand, a corporate crime of omission was not required by the UN or 
OECD Conventions nor was it recommended in the reports of those conventions’ 
monitoring bodies. Rather, the CCC Bill corresponds to “soft” OECD 
recommendations and other non-binding or non-public international standards on 
corruption. In particular, the Australian proposal would seem to borrow from the 
Bribery Act 2010 (UK), and thus to incorporate the outcomes of earlier battles 
between the OECD and the British government, as well as US regulatory 
preferences. On the other hand, the CCC Bill has some of the hallmarks of a new 
governmental approach to corruption control, with its defense for companies with 
adequate procedures and its provisions for negotiated corporate settlements 
(DPAs). In combination, these measures seem designed to enhance the 
Commonwealth’s capacity to prosecute corporate foreign bribery and to engage the 
corporate sector as partners in law enforcement. Transnational criminal law theory, 
as framed by Boister, would deemphasize the non-criminal features of the recent 
Australian proposal and its potential regulatory implications.
This analysis then opened up the way for applying TLO theory in the 
Australian case. Halliday and Shaffer’s approach was useful initially for illuminating 
the range of actors and factors that seemed to motivate the proposed Australian 
reforms. For TLO theory not only points to the role of powerful states and non-
state moral entrepreneurs in diffusing social norms through international networks 
and organizations. In addition, it calls for an examination of how agents and 
structures interact at multiple levels of governance, and with respect to each other, 
in the context of particular governmental decisions. Hence, in the Australian case, 
TLO theory draws attention to the processes by which the OECD and UN, US and 
UK contributed to the CCC Bill, in addition to the role of Australian officials, 
companies, and policy traditions in shaping the drafters’ preferred corporate 
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criminal liability rules. TLO theory then takes an agnostic stance on the most 
relevant features of domestic criminal justice reforms and the possibilities of 
appraising those measures in any absolute sense. In the case of Australia, this 
agnosticism permits both the new governance and traditional criminal features of 
the CCC Bill to come to the fore. A TLO approach would allow the CCC Bill to be 
considered for its possibilities, as well as its pitfalls, and from the perspective of a 
range of affected parties. In this way, the avowedly sociolegal orientation of TLO 
theory exposes the challenge of evaluating rules without assuming particular notions 
of legitimacy or “good” crime governance. It also places questions about 
rightfulness in the context of questions about a law’s prospects for success or 
failure, as is important in the case of Australia’s pending corporate foreign bribery 
reforms.
